OpenAI 기업소개
오픈AI(OpenAI)는 프렌들리 AI 개발을 추구하며, 인류의 이익 실현을 목표로 하는 미국의 비영리단체. 산하에 이윤 목적의 별도 기업인 OpenAI LP를 두고 있다. 미래에 발생 가능한 AGI(인공 일반 지능)의 위험을 대비하고자 2015년 설립되었으며, 일론 머스크, 샘 올트먼 등이 설립을 주도하였다.
대형 언어모델 (LLM)을 개발하고, 이를 기반으로 하는 ChatGPT, DALL-E 등의 인공지능 모델 기반 서비스를 제공하며, 2024년 2월 text-to-speech AI Sora를 런칭하였다.
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매출/투자 성과
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2022년 매출 $3,000만, 2023년 2억 달러, 2024년 10억 달러 매출 목표
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2023년 매출 전망(24억 달러) 기반 PSR 밸류에이션은 약 12배 수준
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2023년 1월 마이크로소프트 외 VC 투자 유치 @$290억 밸류에이션 (2021년 $140억)
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2024년 2월 기준 기업가치 $80B (Thrive Capital)
The deal lets employees cash out their shares in the company, rather than a traditional funding round that would raise money for business operations.
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비용구조
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2022년 컴퓨팅 비용 4억 1,650만 달러, 인건비 8,931만 달러, 운영비 3,875만 달러가 소요되어 연간 순손실 5.4억 달러를 기록했다. 인건비나 운영비 상승이 제한적이라고 하더라도 컴퓨팅 비용은 플랫폼 확장에 따라 필연적으로 증가할 수밖에 없다.
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향후 개발방향
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“지피티5, 당분간 개발하지 않을 것” 올트먼이 거대언어모델 시대의 종말을 강조하는 이유는 고비용 구조 때문으로, 2023년 3월에 출시한 지피티4 훈련에 1억달러 이상이 소요됨. 따라서 OpenAI는 향후 거대언어모델의 중추 역할을 하는 ‘트랜스포머’의 효율을 높이는 데 매개변수 확장이 아닌 비용 효율화 전략을 사용할 것으로 예측됨.
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“새로운 인공지능 모델 설계나 구조, 그리고 인간 피드백에 기반한 추가 조정이 유망한 방향” 향후 인공지능은 사람이 인공지능 답변의 질을 판단하는 과정을 거치도록 하는 방식으로 인공지능의 고품질 답변을 유도하는 방향으로 개발될 것.
1. 회사 개요
비영리단체 설립 (2015)
산하 영리법인 신설 및 외부 투자 유치 (2019)
올트먼 해임사태 (2023)
올트먼 복귀 (2023)
현재 (2024)
2. 지배구조 (2024.02)
OpenAI 정관 내용 중 일부
Only a minority of board members are allowed to hold financial stakes in the partnership at one time. Furthermore, only board members without such stakes can vote on decisions where the interests of limited partners and OpenAI Nonprofit’s mission may conflict—including any decisions about making payouts to investors and employees.
As mentioned above, economic returns for investors and employees are capped (with the cap negotiated in advance on a per-limited partner basis). Any excess returns go to OpenAI Nonprofit. Our goal is to ensure that most of the value (monetary or otherwise) we create if successful benefits everyone, so we think this is an important first step. Returns for our first round of investors are capped at 100x their investment (commensurate with the risks in front of us), and we expect this multiple to be lower for future rounds as we make further progress.
While investors typically seek financial returns, we saw a path to aligning their motives with our mission. We achieved this innovation with a few key economic and governance provisions:
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첫째, 영리 자회사는 OpenAI 비영리단체가 완전히 통제합니다. 이를 위해 비영리 단체가 영리 자회사를 통제하고 관리할 수 있는 권한을 가진 관리 법인(OpenAI GP LLC)을 전적으로 소유하고 통제하도록 했습니다.
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둘째, 이사회는 여전히 비영리단체의 이사회이기 때문에 각 이사는 광범위한 이익을 위한 미션 - 안전한 AGI를 위해 신탁 의무를 수행해야 합니다. 영리 자회사는 수익을 창출하고 분배하는 것이 허용되지만, 이 사명에 따라야 합니다. 비영리 자회사의 주요 수혜자는 OpenAI 투자자가 아닌 인류입니다.
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셋째, 이사회는 과반수 이상의 독립성을 유지합니다. 사외이사는 OpenAI의 지분을 보유하지 않습니다. 심지어 OpenAI의 CEO인 샘 알트먼도 직접 지분을 보유하지 않습니다. 알트먼은 정규직이 되기 전에 OpenAI에 소액을 투자한 와이콤비네이터 투자 펀드를 통해 간접적으로 지분을 보유하고 있을 뿐입니다.
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넷째, Microsoft를 포함한 투자자와 직원에게 배분되는 이익은 상한선이 정해져 있습니다. 한도를 초과하여 창출된 모든 잔여 가치는 인류의 이익을 위해 비영리 단체에 반환됩니다.
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다섯째, 이사회는 AGI 달성 시점을 결정합니다. 다시 말하지만, AGI는 경제적으로 가장 가치 있는 작업에서 인간을 능가하는 고도로 자율적인 시스템을 의미합니다. 이러한 시스템은 AGI 이전 기술에만 적용되는 Microsoft와의 IP 라이선스 및 기타 상업적 조건에서 제외됩니다.
이런 5가지 조건이 생겨난 조직구조는 OpenAI가 비영리기관에서 시작되었기 때문입니다. OpenAI 설립 초기, 설립자들이 제일 우려했던 점은 빅테크 기업들이 OpenAI의 AGI를 독점하게 되어 만인에게 이익을 제공하지 못하게 되는 것을 우려햇을 것. 때문에 아무리 빅테크가 OpenAI에 투자를 하더라도 배분되는 이익의 상한선이 정해져 있으며 모든 의결권은 OpenAI 이사회가 통제하는 방식의 governance 구조를 만들게 됨.
자사 홈페이지에서도 투자자의 이익보다 안전한 방식의 AGI 구현이 우선 순위에 있다는 점을 명시하고 있다. 이러한 구조 속에 비영리 단체 OpenAI Inc.는 수익률이 제한된 영리기업인 OpenAI Global LLC를 지배하고 있다. 따라서 OpenAI는 지분율에 상관 없이 사외이사가 50% 이상으로 채워진 비영리 단체 OpenAI Inc.의 이사회에 전권이 부여된 구조로 구성되어 있다.
오픈AI 홈페이지의 기존 지배구조 설명. 최정점에 비영리법인이 위치하고 홀딩스를 거쳐 사업법인을 움직이는 구조다. MS는 최하위의 사업법인 지분 49%를 지니고 있다.
오픈AI는 ‘영리 법인’인 ‘오픈AI 글로벌(OpenAI Global)’을 자회사로 설립했다. 영리 법인은 투자를 받고 이에서 나온 수익금을 투자자들에게 배분할 수 있는 형태의 회사다. MS가 130억여 달러를 투자한 업체가 바로 영리 법인인 ‘오픈AI 글로벌’이다. 다른 IT 업체나 벤처 캐피털, 심지어 직원들도 ‘오픈AI 글로벌’에 투자했고, 그와 관련된 소유권도 갖는다.
다만 오픈AI의 일반 주주는 아직 없다. 공개 기업이 아니기 때문이다. 기업공개(IPO) 계획도 없다. 그렇다면 오픈AI 글로벌은 일종의 ‘비공개 주식회사’라고 볼 수 있지 않을까? 그렇지 않다. 이 영리 법인에 대한 통제권(이사 임명, 수익 배분 등)은 투자자의 것이 아니다. 전적으로 ‘비영리 이사회’, 좀 더 정확하게는 이사회가 만들고 100% 소유한 ‘관리 법인(OpenAI GP)’의 권한으로 되어 있다.
오픈AI의 홈페이지에 있는 ‘우리 회사의 구조(Our Structure)’는 다음과 같이 설명한다. “영리 자회사는 비영리 단체(이사회와 관리 법인인 OpenAI GP를 가리키는 듯)가 완전히 통제한다. 영리 자회사는 수익을 창출하고 분배하는 것이 허용되지만, (오픈AI 설립의) 사명에 따라야 한다. 비영리 자회사의 주요 수혜자는 OpenAI의 투자자가 아니라 인류다.”
오픈AI는 MS로부터 130억 달러 이상의 투자를 받았지만, MS는 오픈AI로부터 이사회 자리나 통제권을 전혀 건네받지 못했다. 또한 오픈AI 글로벌은 수익을 일정 규모로 제한하는, ‘이익제한기업(Capped-profit company)’이다. 정해진 규모 이상으로 수익을 내면 그 초과분은 모회사인 비영리 관리 법인(OpenAI GP)에 넘겨야 한다. 투자자들의 수익도 투자 원금의 정해진 배수로 제한된다. 직원들에 대한 보수도 마찬가지다.
‘우리 회사의 구조’에서 오픈AI는 MS가 이런 조건들을 받아들였기 때문에 “컴퓨팅 및 상업 파트너로 MS를 선택했다”고 써놓았다.
영리 자회사인 ‘오픈AI 글로벌’의 설립 취지문에도 “이익 극대화보다 공공의 이익을 우선한다”는 문구가 들어가 있다. 미국의 IT 전문지 〈와이어드〉(11월20일)에 따르면, 오픈AI는 투자자들에게 이렇게 경고한다. “오픈AI에 대한 투자는 기부로 보는 것이 현명할 겁니다.”
오픈AI는 정치권이나 재벌가족 정도가 아니라 ‘투자자로부터의 독립’을 말하는 기업이다. 다른 회사라면 꿈도 꾸지 못할 일이다. MS가 오픈AI에서 축출된 올트먼과 브록먼을 자사로 끌어들이는 동시에 오픈AI 측엔 ‘앞으로도 잘 협력하자’고 말한 것엔 나름대로의 속셈이 있을 것이다.
3. 이사회
Key employees:
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Board of the OpenAI nonprofit: [97]
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Bret Taylor (chairman)
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Lawrence Summers, American economist, former US Secretary of the Treasury, director of National Economic Council, president of Harvard University
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Microsoft (observer)
Individual investors: [102]
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Jessica Livingston, a founding partner of Y Combinator
Corporate investors:
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Microsoft [105]
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Thrive Capital, Sequoia Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, K2 Global (2024)
현직 이사회 구성원
이름 | 재직 기간 | 주요 이력 | 비고 |
애덤 디엔젤로 | 2018년 4월~ | Quora(CEO) | 올트먼을 해고한 이사회에서 유일하게 남았으며, 그의 복귀 여부를 놓고 이사회를 대표하여 임시 CEO였던 에밋 쉬어와 협상에 돌입했던 것으로 알려졌다.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-21/altman-openai-board-open-talks-to-negotiate-his-possible-return |
로렌스 서머스 | 2023년 11월~ | 하버드 대학교
(종신교수) | |
브렛 테일러 | 2023년 11월~
(이사회 의장) | 세일즈포스
(전임 CEO) | 올트먼 해임 사태 이후 사내 임직원들이 테일러를 이사회에 포함시킬 것을 요구하면서 의장으로 합류했다. |
디 템플턴 | 2024년 1월~ | Microsoft (부사장) | 올트먼 해임 사태의 여파로 인해 의결권 없는 참관인으로 합류했다. |
전직 이사회 구성원
이름 | 재직 기간 | 주요 이력 | 비고 |
일론 머스크 | 2015~2018년 | 테슬라 (CEO) | |
샘 올트먼 | 2015~2023년 | OpenAI (CEO) | 첫 번째 이사회부터 머스크와 공동 의장으로 참여했다. 2023년 11월 수츠케버, 매카울리, 토너, 디엔젤로가 해임안에 찬성하며 퇴임했다. |
그렉 브록만 | 2015~2023년 | OpenAI (사장) | 첫 번째 이사회부터 참여했으며 이후 이사회 의장에 올랐다. 2023년 11월 수츠케버, 매카울리, 토너, 디엔젤로가 해임안에 찬성하며 퇴임했다. |
일리야 수츠케버 | 2015~2023년 | OpenAI (수석과학자) | 첫 번째 이사회부터 참여했다. 2023년 11월 올트먼과 브록만 해임 사태에 가담한 것에 대한 책임으로 새로운 이사회를 꾸리기 위해 자진 퇴임했다. |
홀든 카노프스키 | 2017~2021년 | 오픈필란트로피 (디렉터) | |
리드 호프먼 | 2018~2023년 | Inflection AI (이사) | 초기부터 기부에 동참하고 투자자로 합류했으나, 동종업계 경쟁사인 Inflection AI를 창업하면서 이해관계 상충으로 인해 시리즈 A 펀딩 투자를 받기 직전인 2023년 3월 퇴임했다. |
시본 질리스 | 2019~2023년 | 뉴럴링크 (디렉터) | 사내 갈등으로 인해 퇴사한 머스크의 측근이다. 관련 사항으로 인해 2023년 3월 퇴임한 것으로 추정된다. |
타샤 매카울리 | 2019~2023년 | 지오심시스템 (CEO) | |
윌 허드 | 2021~2023년 | 텍사스 23구 (연방하원의원) | 2024년 미국 대통령 선거 경선에 참여하기 위해 2023년 7월 퇴임했다. 이후 올트먼 해임 사태 이후 사내 임직원들이 허드의 이사회 복귀를 요구했으나, 합류하진 않았다. |
헬렌 토너 | 2021~2023년 | CSET (디렉터) | 2023년 11월 올트먼과 브록만의 해임에 찬성한 이후 투자자들과 임직원들의 반발로 인해 퇴임했다. 10월에 OpenAI를 공개적으로 비판하는 뉘앙스의 글을 기고하기도 했다. https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/decoding-intentions/ |
4. 연계기업 지배구조
Microsoft
현재 시가총액 3조달러(약 3979조3400억원)인 마이크로소프트는 1975년 빌 게이츠와 폴 앨런이 공동 창업한 소프트웨어 기업이다. 소프트웨어, 서비스, 장치 및 솔루션을 개발해 지원하며, 컴퓨터 운영 체제인 윈도우와 클라우드 서비스 애저(Azure), X박스(Xbox), 오피스365 등이 있다. 사티아 나델라(Satya Nadella)가 CEO를 맡고 있다.
현재는 Microsoft Azure를 비롯한 클라우드 부문의 매출이 운영체제 부문의 매출을 뛰어넘었고, CEO인 사티아 나델라도 이제부터는 회사의 우선순위를 Windows에서 클라우드 중심으로 변경하겠다고 선언한 바 있다.
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부채 $2,057.5억
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자본 $2,062억
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매출 $2,119억 (약 275조 6080억 원)
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영업이익 $885억, 영업이익률 약 4.18% (2023년)
매출 상세 : Intelligent Cloud (34%), Productivity & Business Processes (34%), More Personal Computing (32%)
주요 투자이력
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2023년 6월 Inflection AI 투자 (무스타파 슐레이만, 리드 호프먼(former Google executive founders)), 창업 1년만에 무려 13억 달러 투자를 유치하며 40억 달러 기업가치를 인정 받음
MSFT 마이크로소프트 주요 주주 현황 (상위 20대, 2024.02.01)
주주명 | 보유량(주) | 지분율 | 전월 대비 | |
1 | The Vanguard Group, Inc. | 6억5014만 | 8.75% | - |
2 | BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. | 3억4095만 | 4.59% | - |
3 | State Street Global Advisors (US) | 2억9361만 | 3.95% | - |
4 | Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund | 2억3287만 | 3.13% | - |
5 | Fidelity Management & Research Company LLC | 2억 | 2.69% | - |
6 | Vanguard 500 Index Fund | 1억8109만 | 2.44% | +0.03%P |
7 | T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. | 1억4982만 | 2.02% | - |
8 | Geode Capital Management, L.L.C. | 1억4812만 | 1.99% | - |
9 | SPDR S&P 500 ETF | 9225만 | 1.24% | +0.10%P |
10 | Fidelity 500 Index Fund | 8657만 | 1.16% | - |
11 | Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) | 8631만 | 1.16% | - |
12 | Capital World Investors | 8550만 | 1.15% | - |
13 | Statens Pensjonsfond Utland | 8460만 | 1.14% | - |
14 | Capital International Investors | 8373만 | 1.13% | - |
15 | JP Morgan Asset Management | 7549만 | 1.02% | - |
16 | iShares Core S&P 500 ETF | 7398만 | 1.00% | +0.02%P |
17 | Capital Research Global Investors | 7343만 | 0.99% | - |
18 | Wellington Management Company, LLP | 6693만 | 0.90% | - |
19 | Vanguard Growth Index Fund | 6545만 | 0.88% | - |
20 | Invesco Capital Management (QQQ Trust) | 5265만 | 0.71% | 신규 |
합계 | 42.06% |
2024년 1월, 1개월 간 SPDR S&P 500 ETF가 786만3820주, Vanguard 500 Index Fund가 167만3180주를, iShares Core S&P 500 ETF가 83만1230주, Fidelity 500 Index Fund가 55만952주를, Vanguard Growth Index Fund가 35만7812주, Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund가 31만7460주 취득
마이크로소프트와 OpenAI의 관계
“Shortly after announcing the OpenAI capped profit structure (and our initial round of funding) in 2019, we entered into a strategic partnership with Microsoft. We subsequently extended our partnership, expanding both Microsoft’s total investment as well as the scale and breadth of our commercial and supercomputing collaborations.
While our partnership with Microsoft includes a multibillion dollar investment, OpenAI remains an entirely independent company governed by the OpenAI Nonprofit. Microsoft is a non-voting board observer and has no control. And, as explained above, AGI is explicitly carved out of all commercial and IP licensing agreements.
These arrangements exemplify why we chose Microsoft as our compute and commercial partner. From the beginning, they accepted our capped equity offer and our request to leave AGI technologies and governance for the Nonprofit and the rest of humanity. They have also worked with us to create and refine our joint safety board that reviews our systems before they are deployed. Harkening back to our origins, they understand that this is a unique and ambitious project that requires resources at the scale of the public sector, as well as the very same conscientiousness to share the ultimate results with everyone.”
관련기사
반독점 압박에 선 긋는 MS·오픈AI…"이익 목적 투자일 뿐"
'올트먼 해임' 재발 막자…"MS, 오픈AI 지배구조 변화 논의 중"
5. 시사점
Controversies
OpenAI has undoubtedly succeeded in its product innovations, with ChatGPT. But its governance innovations have failed spectacularly. Put in place to guard against the abuse of its product, the company’s unusual structure — a nonprofit that owns a for-profit — proved unpredictable and subject to the whims of its directors. There’s a reason the most successful startups stick to best practice: A more traditional governance structure would help OpenAI to scale while making the development of its technology more predictable.
CEOs and founders use dual-class share structures to protect themselves from losing control of their company. The rights assigned to these shareholders vary, but they often include outsize voting power, guaranteed board seats, or other governance provisions that make it hard for a board to topple them even if a company goes public. Some companies, like Google, even have three classes of shares, for its founders, employees, and investors.
Altman didn’t have those protections. Brockman, the former OpenAI president, said that Altman found out he was “being fired” in a virtual meeting Friday noon. Investors like to back visionary founders. Some, like Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund, have centered their investment theses around the idea. Not having equity in the company could have been perceived as reducing Altman’s “skin in the game,” so to speak. But it also meant that Altman, lacking those protections, was open to a boardroom coup.
OpenAI’s small board lacks the experience that would be expected from a company of its size and importance. None of its largest backers, not even Microsoft, have board seats. Until Altman and Brockman’s departure, it was composed of three outside directors and three OpenAI executives.
Brockman wasn’t involved in Altman’s firing, meaning that every outside director and Sutskever would have had to all vote to fire Altman. With no allies on the six-person board, it was a mathematical impossibility that Altman could win.
앞으로의 방향성
As a Board, we are focused on strengthening OpenAI’s corporate governance. Here’s how we plan to do it:
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We will build a qualified, diverse Board of exceptional individuals whose collective experience represents the breadth of OpenAI’s mission – from technology to safety to policy. We are pleased that this Board will include a non-voting observer for Microsoft.
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We will further stabilize the OpenAI organization so that we can continue to serve our mission. This will include convening an independent committee of the Board to oversee a review of the recent events.
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We will enhance the governance structure of OpenAI so that all stakeholders – users, customers, employees, partners, and community members – can trust that OpenAI will continue to thrive.
The unusual ingredients of OpenAI’s governance structure have been dissected in recent weeks: It is a nonprofit that controls a for-profit; employees had equity in the for-profit but the CEO and the directors didn’t; investors in the for-profit had a cap on the return they could receive; and investors had no control rights, because those remained with the nonprofit board. (In fact, the CEO of Microsoft, OpenAI’s biggest investor, only found out about the ouster right before it happened.)
In mixing the for-profit and nonprofit models, OpenAI hoped for the best of both worlds. Instead, it got the worst of both and underscored the importance of best practices in management and governance. Innovative founders and companies can be tempted to reinvent everything all at once. But successful startups resist doing so. They focus on changing one big thing (usually the product) while doubling down on best practices in other areas.
startups can fail when founders act as unconstrained monarchs. That was, in part, the failure of FTX. And it’s why the most successful startups typically cede control gradually from the founder(s) to investors, management, and other employees. Ideally, all of these groups are aligned through equity in the company but no single person has full control.
OpenAI’s decision making proved much more similar to the tech monarchies he was deriding. The OpenAI board was answerable only to itself and its subjective interpretation of the nonprofit’s mission, leading to the chaos and failed coup against Altman. This is, to say the least, not an improvement of corporate governance. It’s a hollowing out of it.
To be fair, OpenAI’s creators had reasons for selecting the model they did. They were reportedly worried about the effects of unrestrained AI development and how it might play out under the classic model of startup growth. Yet, they needed capital because their work was expensive, and needed to be mindful of the pitfalls of compromising governance best practices.
How OpenAI’s Bizarre Structure Gave 4 People the Power to Fire Sam Altman
Chaos at OpenAI has its root in an unusual corporate structure designed to protect humanity against rogue AI—some investors had expressed fears it could weaken the company.
When Sam Altman, Elon Musk, and other investors formed the startup behind ChatGPT as a US not-for-profit organization in 2015, Altman told Vanity Fair he had very little experience with nonprofits. “So I’m just not sure how it’s going to go,” he said.
He couldn’t have imagined the drama of this week, with four directors on OpenAI’s nonprofit board unexpectedly firing him as CEO and removing the company’s president as chairman of the board. But the bylaws Altman and his cofounders initially established and a restructuring in 2019 that opened the door to billions of dollars in investment from Microsoft gave a handful of people with no financial stake in the company the power to upend the project on a whim.
An attempt to restore Altman as CEO and replace the board ran into difficulty Sunday over the role of existing directors in choosing their replacements, Bloomberg reported.
Altman’s firing caught investors off guard, including prominent firms such as Khosla Ventures, which has a significant stake in OpenAI, as well as Andreessen Horowitz and Sequoia Capital, which have smaller slices of shares, according to two people familiar with the matter not authorized to speak to media about the startup. Spokespeople for Khosla, Sequoia, and Andreessen declined to comment.
One of the sources says some investors had previously feared OpenAI’s remaining independent directors—with little background in corporate governance—could end up failing in their oversight duties. Less thought was given to the possibility of aggressive action like that taken against Altman. “I never expected them to be activists,” the person says.
The 11-page bylaws OpenAI Inc. established in January 2016 give board members the exclusive right to elect and remove fellow directors and also to determine the board’s size. The rules also say that a majority of the board can take any action without prior notice or a formal meeting, as long as a majority of board members provide written consent.
Nathan Benaich, general partner of Air Street Capital and coauthor of the “State of AI Report,” says OpenAI's corporate structure has proven to be at odds with the need to support cutting-edge research through huge amounts of equity investment. "It was an experiment to defy the laws of corporate physics, and it appears that physics won out," he says.
It’s unclear if the OpenAI nonprofit has tweaked those bylaws since the initial filing on the California Department of Justice’s Registry of Charitable Trusts. The nonprofit reported no “significant changes to its governing documents” in filings to US tax authorities through 2021, the last year for which data could be obtained.
But the original rules and the gradual dwindling of board members, due to conflicts of interest and a dispute with Musk, could help explain how a small group could sack Altman without chairman Greg Brockman’s involvement, and eject both Brockman and Altman from the panel. OpenAI, the California agency, Altman, Brockman, and the four remaining directors did not respond to requests for comment.
OpenAI had warned investors on the cover sheet of key documents that "it would be wise to view any investment in OpenAI in the spirit of a donation,” according to a federal tax filing.
Utopian Quest
OpenAI was formed as a nonprofit in line with the project’s mission to develop artificial intelligence that would be safe and beneficial for humanity and provide a counterweight to profit-driven AI labs at giants like Google.
Altman and Musk were the sole initial board members, according to the Vanity Fair interview. “We realize the two of us aren’t a perfect sample of what everyone in the world thinks is important,” Altman said. “I’d say we plan to expand that group.”
OpenAI did expand its board, but the new members were generally also white men from the slice of Silicon Valley concerned that future, ultra-powerful AI could turn against humanity. By 2017, executives involved from the earliest days, including Brockman, research chief Ilya Sutskever, and then COO Chris Clark, had joined the board, according to the nonprofit’s federal tax filings.
Also on the board was Holden Karnofsky, founder of Open Philanthropy, an effective-altruism group that donated to OpenAI. LinkedIn cofounder and venture capitalist Reid Hoffman, one of the project’s initial backers, joined in 2018.
A feud over the direction of OpenAI led Musk to step down from the board in 2018 after failing to take over the project. The following year, OpenAI formed a for-profit subsidiary to lure the funding and employees needed to pursue its leaders’ ambitious and expensive AI development plans.
Venture capitalists and employees could now get some return on the money or sweat that they invested in the company—but the nonprofit’s board still maintained ultimate say over the for-profit business through several new legal provisions, according to OpenAI.
The directors’ primary fiduciary duty remained to uphold its mission of safe development of artificial general intelligence beneficial to all of humanity. Only a minority of directors could have financial stakes in the for-profit company, and the for-profit company’s founding documents require that it give priority to public benefits over maximizing profits.
The revised structure unlocked a torrent of funding to OpenAI, in particular from Microsoft, ultimately allowing OpenAI to marshal the cloud computing power needed to create ChatGPT.
Among the new board crew helming this unique structure were Shivon Zilis, a longtime associate of Elon Musk and later mother of twins with the entrepreneur, who joined in 2019 after serving as adviser. Will Hurd, a former Republican congressman, signed up in 2021.
Concentration of Power
In 2023, OpenAI’s board started to shrink, narrowing its bench of experience and setting up the conditions for Altman’s ouster. Hoffman left in January, according to his LinkedIn profile, and he later cited potential conflicts of interest with other AI investments. Zilis resigned in March, and Hurd in July to focus on an unsuccessful run for US president.
Those departures shrank OpenAI’s board to just six directors, one less than the maximum allowed in its original bylaws. With Brockman, Sutskever, and Altman still members of the group, it was evenly split among executives and people from outside of OpenAI—no longer majority independent, as Altman weeks earlier had testified to US senators.
The dramatic turn came Friday when, according to Brockman, chief scientist Sutskever informed him and Altman about their removals from the board shortly before a public announcement of the changes, which also included Altman’s firing as CEO because “he was not consistently candid in his communications with the board.” Brockman subsequently resigned from his role as OpenAI’s president. Sutskever reportedly had been concerned about his diminished role inside OpenAI and Altman’s fast-paced commercialization of its technologies.
The leadership upheaval threw OpenAI into crisis, but arguably the board functioned as intended—as an entity independent of the for-profit company and empowered to act as it sees necessary to accomplish the project’s overall mission. Sutskever and the three independent directors would form the majority needed to make changes without notice under the initial bylaws. Those rules allow for removals of any director, including the chair, at any time by fellow directors with or without cause.
Beside Sutskever, the remaining directors include Adam D’Angelo, an early Facebook employee who has served since 2018 and is CEO of Q&A forum Quora, which licenses technology from OpenAI and AI rivals; entrepreneur Tasha McCauley, who took her seat in 2018; and Helen Toner, an AI safety researcher at Georgetown University who joined the board in 2021. Toner previously worked at the effective-altruism group Open Philanthropy, and McCauley is on the UK board of Effective Ventures, another effective-altruism-focused group.
During an interview in July for a WIRED October cover story on OpenAI, D'Angelo said that he had joined and remained on the board to help steer the development of artificial general intelligence toward “better outcomes.” He described the for-profit entity as a benefit to the nonprofit's mission, not one in contention with it. “Having to actually make the economics work, I think, is a good force on an organization,” D'Angelo said.
The drama of the past few days has led OpenAI leaders, staff, and investors to question the governance structure of the project.
Amending the rules of OpenAI’s board isn’t easy—the initial bylaws place the power to do so exclusively in the hands of a board majority. As OpenAI investors encourage the board to bring Altman back, he has reportedly said he would not return without changes to the governance structure he helped create. That would require the board to reach a consensus with the man it just fired.
OpenAI’s structure, once celebrated for charting a brave course, is now drawing condemnation across Silicon Valley. Marissa Mayer, previously a Google executive and later Yahoo CEO, dissected OpenAI’s governance in a series of posts on X. The seats that went vacant this year should have been filled quickly, she said. “Most companies of OpenAI’s size and consequence have boards of 8-15 directors, most of whom are independent and all of whom has more board experience at this scale than the 4 independent directors at OpenAI,” she wrote. “AI is too important to get this wrong.”
Anthropic, a rival AI firm founded in 2021 by ex-OpenAI employees, has undertaken its own experiment in devising a corporate structure to keep future AI on the rails. It was founded as a public-benefit corporation legally pledged to prioritize helping humanity alongside maximizing profit. Its board is overseen by a trust with five independent trustees chosen for experience beyond business and AI, who will ultimately have the power to select a majority of Anthropic’s board seats.
Seth Berman, CEO of Ethical Compass Advisors, which helped Anthropic design its governance structure, says the team involved spent countless hours gaming out different options. The chosen design is supposed to create a balance of power. Directors chosen by trustees will have the votes to force their will, but they can’t do so without at least listening to the rest of the board. And a supermajority of shareholders can remove trustee-backed directors, but trustees get to choose replacements, he says. “You don’t want to put all the power in either of those camps, the not-for-profit or the for-profit,” Berman says.
Anthropic’s announcement of that structure acknowledged that the novel structure will ultimately be judged by its results. “We’re not yet ready to hold this out as an example to emulate; we are empiricists and want to see how it works,” the company’s announcement said. OpenAI is now scrambling to reset its own experiment in designing corporate governance resilient to both superintelligent AI and ordinary human squabbles.
references
insight edge 아티클 전문 (pdf)
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